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JURISDICTION IN EQUITY OVER FOREIGN
LANDS.
What is the rule in this State regarding the right of an equity
court to render decrees in personam though the decrees will affect
the title to lands outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court?
That such decrees are within the powers of a court of equity has been
settled doctrine ever since the decision of Lord Hardwicke in Penn
v. Baltimore, 1 Ves. Sen. 455; two prerequisites to granting them
being that all interested parties are before the court, and that the suit
falls under some head of equity jurisdiction: for example, the specific
enforcement of a contract, fraud or trust (Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch,
148) Another condition of granting the relief is that the decree can
be enforced by direct coercion of the defendant; for example, by
compelling him to execute a conveyance of the property in question
to the plaintiff, or hold it in trust for the latter, or by enjoining him
to refrain from waste. The court will not undertake to interfere with
the possession of foreign lands or undertake to divert or invest the
title by direct decree though it is obvious that by compelling a con-
veyance the title would be affected. (Westlake, Private International
Law, 58; Morris v. Remington, 1 Parson's Equity; Muller v. Dows,
94 U. S. 444.) In Missouri, the exercise of this power of courts of
equity has been treated in some decisions as limited by the statute
(R. S. 1909, sec. 1753) which provides that "suits for the possession
of real estate, or whereby the title thereto may be affected shall be
brought in the county within which such real estate, or some part
thereof, is situate." (De Lashmutt v. Taylor, 261 Mo. 412; State
ex rel v. Grimm, 243 Mo. 667.) In other instances, the courts have
exercised the power as though the cited statute had not, as to the
particular case, abridged it; (McCune et al v. Goodwillie et al, 204
Mo. 306; Olney v. Eaton, 66 Mo. 563). . It may be worth while to
examine the authorities bearing upon the question, to ascertain how
far they are in conflict, or how far reconcilable. In DeLashmutt v.
Taylor, the testator died in Maryland, his domicile, seized of lands
in Missouri, which lands his will devised to a trustee with power to
sell when and as the trustee deemed best. The testamentary trustee,
after serving for years, filed an ex parte petition in a Maryland court
to be relieved of the trust, whereupon the court decreed as prayed,
and appointed a substitute to act in his place. The substitute trustee
sold and conveyed the Missouri lands, acting under the authority of
the Maryland decree. The Supreme Court of Missouri held that the
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conveyance passed no title to the plurchaser, as the trustee acted only
as an instrument of the Maryland court and in the execution of its
orders, and that said court had no power to decree regarding lands in
Missouri. The decision is sound tested by the rules which have
always been held to control the power of courts of equity to grant
relief in personarn when it affects foreign immovables, for the Mary-
land court did not have the parties in interest before it when it
appointed the substitute trustee. The Missouri statute was not cited
nor was it necessary to do so, but the court referred to the case of
State ex rel v. Grimm, supra. as drawing the line between cases in
which courts may decree concerning foreign lands and those in which
they may not; referred also to McCune v. Goodwillie, supra, as
though the decision in that case was in accord with the one in State
ex rel v. Grimm. But those two decisions appear to be in conflict.
McCune v. Goodwillie was an action under sec. 650 of the R. S. of
1899 (sec. 2535, R. S. 1909) to establish the title to and the interest
of the plaintiffs and the defendants in lands in Henry County, Missouri.
The action was converted into a suit in equity by an answer filed by
one of the defendants. The common source of title was Dixon Brown,
who lived and died in the State of Ohio and left a will dated February,
1878, whereby he devised the lands in dispute to his four children:
George, John, and Catherine Brown, and Ella P. McCune. After
making this will, he conveyed the lands to his daughter Catherine, and
after his death and the death of said Catherine, Ella McCune filed a
suit in the court of the testator's Ohio domicile, to set aside and cancel
the deed to Catherine for fraud in obtaining it from her father. All
the parties in interest being before the court in said cause, a decree
was entered that the deed of Dixon Brown to his daughter, Catherine,
be set aside and for naught held, and that her son, Frank Stafford,
on coming of age, reconvey to the devisees of Dixon Brown all interest
in the lands which had accrued to him as heir of his mother, through
her father's deed to the mother. The question before the Supreme
Court of Missouri was whether this decree of the Ohio court was
binding on the parties to the Ohio suit, or whether it was void, because
it affected the title to lands in Missouri. Without noticing the Mis-
souri statute cited above, the Supreme Court declared that the parties
to the Ohio suit "and all those in privity with them, are estopped by
the decree. They had their day in a court of equity having jurisdic-
tion of their persons. It had jurisdiction of the subject matter and
could bind and did bind the conscience of every party to that suit.
While the decree could not directly affect the bare legal title to lands
in Missouri, yet it could and did conclude all parties in every issue
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in that case" Though the court held the parties were further estopped
by acting in accordance with the Ohio decree, this fact was only
stated as an additional reason for the judgment, and in no ways breaks
the force of the decision as an authority for the proposition that a
foreign court of equity, having the parties in interest before it in a
case of equitable cognizance, may bind the parties by a judgment
concerning the title of lands in Missouri so far as to estop them from
asserting title against the terms of the decree.
State ex rel Hunt et al v. Grimm, Circuit Judge, and the Greer
Investment Company, was a proceeding to obtain a writ of prohibition
against the defendant judge to prevent him from trying a suit insti-
tuted by the Greer Investment Company against the relators Hunt, in
which suit it was charged the Hunts had fraudlently procured from
the Greer Investment Company the deed to lands in Virginia, which
deed the petition prayed might be surrendered and canceled, as a cloud
on the Greer company's title. The deed had been recorded in Virginia
and it was held that the cancellation of a recorded deed would amount
to the destruction of a muniment of title, therefore involved directly
the title to real estate and the jurisdiction of the suit was in the State
where the land lay. Missouri cases were cited to show the decree in the
case would offect the title to real estate: Keyte v. Plummons, 28 Mo.
104; Ensworth v. Holley, 33 Mo. 370; Railroad-v. Mahoney, 42 Mo.
467. But the authority mainly relied on was Castleman v. Castleman,
184 Mo. 432, wherein it was held that an action instituted in Cooper
County, Missouri, to cancel two deeds to lands in that county, was
brought in the right venue, although the defendants resided in St. Louis
and were served with summons there. It was contended for the
defendants that, as the action was one in personam, it would lie only in
the county of the defendants' residence, or of the plantiffs', if the de-
fendants could be served in the latter. (R. S. 1909, sec 1751.) Con-
ceding the general soundness of the proposition that equity acts in per-
sonam and therefore the defendant when brought before the court
may be proceeded against by a personal decree, it was declared the cited
section of the Missouri Statutes had engrafted an exception on that
rule in cases involving title to real estate. Clearly the decision was
correct if the statute in question was intended to apply to equity cases
affecting the title to lands, as well as to actions as law involving such
titles. The statute runs back to an early day and was, at first, a
regulation of Chancery practice when the procedures at law and in
equity were distinct in this State. In its original form it read "that
suits in equity concerning real estate or whereby the same may be
affected, shall be brought in the court within whose jurisdiction such
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW.
real estate, or the greater part thereof, is situate and in other cases
in the court in whose jurisdiction the defendants, or the majority of
them, if inhabitants of this State, reside." (R. S. 1825, p. 636, sec. 3.)
It will be perceived that the language of the statute has been changed
so that its express terms now make it apply either to suits for the
possession of real estate or whereby the title may be affected. There
can be no doubt that the Castleman case and the other Missouri cases
noticed below, which hold that actions in the nature of suits in equity
instituted in this State and affecting the title to real estate therein, will
only lie in the county where the land lies.
State ex rel Bavin v. Muench, 225 Mo. 210, was a proceeding
in prohibition to prevent a judge of the circuit court of the City of
St. Louis from entertaining two suits to enjoin the relator Gavin from
erecting a railway embankment on a strip of ground, there being an
issue in the suit as to whether the strip which lay outside the city
occupied by the embankment was a public street or belonged to Gavin.
As title was involved, the Supreme Court granted the writ. In Keyte
v. Plemmons, supra, it was held that by virtue of the statute, a suit
would lie in the county where the land lay, to set aside for fraud a
judicial sale of it made under a judgment rendered in another county.
In Insworth v. Holley, 33 Mo. 370, the decision was that suit for
specific performance of a contract for the sale of lands in Buchanan
County, Missouri, would not lie in Holt County, in said State, because
the statute required such a suit to be instituted in the venue of the
situs. It will be observed that all these cases were instituted in Mis-
souri courts and concerned lands in Missouri, therefore were directly
within the terms of the statute, for though they were equity cases it
has been shown that the statute was enacted to fix the venue of such
suits, and therefore restricted the usual power of a court of equity to
entertain jurisdiction of suits affecting the title to lands outside its
territorial jurisdiction. But it is open to serious doubt whether the
statute was meant to take away the power of courts of equity in Mis-
souri to render decrees in personam which would affect the title to lands
outside the State, as was hld in State ex rel v. Grirm, supra. It is
settled law that no statute takes away an ancient jurisdiction of equity
unless the intention to do so is clear on the face of the enactment.
The very words of the statute show that it was meant to establish
the venue for actions to recover possession of, or which affect the
title to, lands in this State. That this was the purpose of the statute
and the limit of its operation was pointed out in the dissenting opinion
in Sate ex rel v. Grimm. Nevertheless, the majority opinion in that'
case is the law of the question. Though later than McCune v. Good-
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willie, the latter is not overruled, but the two decisions are inconsistent
in theory. In McCune v. Goodwillie, as has been seen, the Supreme
Court of this State gave effect to the decree of an Ohio court con-
cerning Missouri land, to the extent of holding the parties to the
decree estopped by it to claim title to the land. This was doing no
more than to acknowledge the power of the Ohio court, as an equity
tribunal, to render a personal judgment whereby the title to foreign
land might be affected, a ruling which accorded with the general
doctrine on that subject, and it is difficult to perceive how a statute to
regulate practice in the Missouri Courts could deprive an Ohio Court
of this equity power. We may, therefore, say that notwithstanding
the construction given to the statute in the Grimm case precludes a
Missouri court from rendering decrees in personam concerning lands
outside the State, there is no decision of the Missouri Supreme Court
which positively holds that this ordinary power of equity courts may
not be exercised by a court of another State, even though the title to
Missouri lands is thereby affected. In line with the decision in
McCune v. Goodwillie, is Olney v. Eaton, 66 Mo. 563, a case filed to
enforce a vendor's lien for an unpaid balance of the purchase price
of land in Atchison County, Missouri. The defendant answered deny-
ing any balance was owing on the price of the land, and alleging that
the price was to be paid partly in money and partly in 20 acres of
land in Kansas, at $40 an acre; that the defendant had tendered the
plaintiff a deed to the Kansas land which the latter had refused to
accept; that the Kansas land, in connection with other payments plain-
tiff had received, would overpay the price of the Missouri lands by
$400, and enforcement of the contract was prayed by the defendant.
The question of the power of the Missouri court to decree specific
performance of a contract relating to Kansas land was raised and
overruled as presenting no difficulty. The opinion said that equity
acted in personam "hence the specific performance of the contract for
the sale of lands lying in a foreign country will be decreed in equity
whenever the party is resident within the jurisdiction of the court."
Olney v. Eaton was not overruled in the Grimm case though the two
cannot be distinguished, unless the fact that in the latter case the deed
was on record in Virginia is material, and it is not perceived that it
is, for the parties who had procured that deed by fraud could be
compelled to reconvey and the deed of reconveyance could be recorded
in Virginia, thus clearing up the title there.
The results of the cases seem to be as follows: first, it is clear
that a suit in equity instituted in Missouri courts, and affecting the
title to or the possession of land in that State, will only lie if instituted
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in the county where the land lies; second, by the decision in the
Grimm case, a suit in equity will not lie in a Missouri court, if the
decree will affect the title to land outside the State; third, by the
decision in McCune v. Goodwillie, the decree of a court in equity of a
foreign State affecting the title to land in Missouri, if rendered with
all the parties in interest before the court, will estop those parties from
claiming contrary to the decree.
RICHARD L. GOODE.
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